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Abstract
The seventeenth-century academic and statesman, Hugo Grotius,
had a profound influence on the development of International Law.
This article explains why Grotius is often called “the father of
international law,” the role played by his great work, The Law of War
and Peace in transforming the international legal system, and why it is
appropriate to characterize fundamental changes to the international
system and the rapid formation of customary international law that
result therefrom in modern times as “Grotian Moments.”
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I. Introduction
Academics have had a profound influence on the development of
international law, and one name stands out above all others: Hugo
Grotius. In the mid-1600s, at the time that the nation-state was
emerging as the fundamental political unit of Europe, Hugo Grotius—
theologian, poet, historian, jurist, statesman, diplomat and
international lawyer—offered a new concept of international law
designed to reflect and progressively develop that new reality. This
article explains why Grotius is often characterized as “the father of
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international law,” the role played by his great work, De Jure Belli ac
Pacis (“The Law of War and Peace”) in transforming international law,
and why it is appropriate to characterize fundamental changes to the
international system and the rapid formation of customary
international law that result therefrom as “Grotian Moments.”

II. Background
A. The Life and Times of Hugo Grotius

To comprehend the Grotian legacy, one must know something
about the turbulent times in which Grotius lived and wrote.1 Hugo de
Groot (young Hugo would subsequently adopt the Latinized “Grotius”)
was born to one of the leading Protestant families of the Dutch City of
Delft on April 10, 1583.2 He grew up during the Eighty Years’ War
(1558–1648) between the Dutch Provinces and the Spanish Empire, and
as an adult Grotius witnessed the horrors of the Thirty Years’ War
(1618–1648), which engulfed the whole of Europe.3
Arising out of the Reformation, the Eighty Years’ War began as a
revolt of the Seventeen Dutch Provinces, which had embraced
Protestantism, against Philip II of Spain, the sovereign of the Habsburg
Netherlands.4 The revolt was a response to King Philip’s heavy-handed
efforts to enforce a policy of strict Catholic religious uniformity
throughout the Spanish Empire, which at that time included the
territory of Spain and its ally, Portugal, as well as Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, most of Italy, various other principalities of
Europe, Mexico, and Peru.5 Over the years, the fortunes of war

*

Dean of Case Western Reserve University School of Law since 2013 and
Joseph C. Hostetler—BakerHostetler Professor of Law.

1.

See generally CHARLES S. EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS, THE MIRACLE OF
HOLLAND: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT (Nelson-Hall
Publishers, 1981); EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF
HUGO GROTIUS (Univ. of Okla. Press, 1969); and C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius
and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century, in HUGO GROTIUS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 98–99 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990), for
additional background information on Hugo Grotius’s life and times.

2.

EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
/grotius/ [https://perma.cc/4JNM-KMJT].

3.

See Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts, Introduction: Grotian Thought
in International Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 1 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).

4.

Eighty Years’ War, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.newworld
encyclopedia.org/entry/Eighty_Years%27_War [https://perma.cc/HZA7LWMN].

5.

Id.
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whipsawed back and forth.6 After the initial Dutch revolt, Philip II’s
armies regained control over most of the rebelling provinces.7 Then the
Northern provinces, under the leadership of William of Orange,
managed to oust the Habsburg armies and establish the Republic of the
Seven United Netherlands.8
There was a temporary truce between Spain and the Dutch
Provinces from 1609 to 1621, followed by a resumption of conflict,
which was accompanied by the launch of the Thirty Years’ War,
involving most of the countries in Europe.9 Like the Eighty Years’ War,
the Thirty Years’ War initially began as religious hostilities between
Protestant- and Catholic-controlled regions of the Holy Roman
Empire.10 It gradually developed into a more general conflict reflecting
the Bourbon France-Habsburg Spain rivalry for European political
preeminence.11 Both wars were marked by extensive destruction of
entire regions, denuded by the foraging armies.12 The resulting ruin,
famine and disease reduced the populace of the German states by thirty
percent on average, while bankrupting most of the combatant powers.13
Armies were expected to be largely self-funding from loot taken or
tribute extorted from the populations where they operated.14 This
encouraged a form of lawlessness that imposed often-severe hardship on
inhabitants of the occupied territory. In the words of one historian,
during the conflict “[h]uman beings, turned by misery into wild beasts,
rivaled the beasts in ferocity and foulness.”15

6.

See id.

7.

See id.

8.

Id.; see also MARIA BROUWER, The Republic of the Seven United Provinces
(1581–1795), in GOVERNMENT FORMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 233,
233–234 (Springer Int’l Publ’g, 2016).

9.

Eighty Years’ War, supra note 4. See Randall C.H. Lesaffer et al., From
Antwerp to Munster (1609/1648): Truce and Peace Under the Law of
Nations, in THE TWELVE YEARS TRUCE 233, 233–34 (1609) (Randall C.H.
Lesaffer ed., 2014), for background information on the temporary truce
known as the “Twelve Years’ Truce.”

10.

Thirty Years’ War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/event/Thirty-Years-War [https://perma.cc/5ALJ-Q9RG].

11.

See id.

12.

See John W. Foster, Evolution of International Law, 18 YALE L.J. 149,
151 (1908), for an account of the brutal effect of the continental warfare
on the region.

13.

Thirty Years’ War, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.newworld
encyclopedia.org/entry/Thirty_Years’_War [https://perma.cc/BFR5-H5
5V].

14.

See id.

15.

Foster, supra note 12, at 151.
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Despite the omnipresent war,16 Grotius thrived as an exceptionally
gifted and well-connected child prodigy. When Grotius was eight, he
began writing skillful elegies in Latin; by eleven, he was a student in
the Faculty of Letters at the University of Leiden, where his father
served as curator.17 Three years later, he published the first of his nearly
sixty books.18 At age fifteen, he accompanied a friend of his father’s,
the leading Dutch politician of the day, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, on
a diplomatic trip to France, where Grotius received a Doctorate from
the University of Orléans.19 The French reaction to the accomplished
young Grotius was similar to the reception Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart
would receive a hundred years later.20 Thus, when the French monarch,
Henry IV, met Grotius during the young man’s visit to the royal court,
the King of France publicly hailed Grotius as “the miracle of Holland.”21
Upon his return to The Netherlands, Grotius was admitted to the
bar of Holland at the age of sixteen.22 He established a law practice in
The Hague, with clientele that included the Dutch East India
Company, Van Oldenbarnevelt (by then the Prime Minister of the
United Netherlands), and Maurice of Nassau (the Prince of Orange).23
Meanwhile, at age eighteen, Grotius was retained by the United Dutch
Provinces to write the official chronicle of their history.24 In 1607 (when
he was twenty-four), Grotius was appointed Attorney General of
Holland, and in 1613 (at age thirty) he was appointed Governor of
Rotterdam.25 One of Grotius’s contemporaries, French scholar and

16.

Notable combat during Grotius’s early years included the siege of Antwerp
(1585), and the battles of Breda (1590), Zutphen, Deventer, Defzijl
Nijmegen (1591), Steenwijk, Coevorden (1592), Geertruidenberg (1593),
Groningen (1594), Grol, Enschede, Ootmarsum, Oldenzaal (1597), Dunkirk,
Nieuwpoort (1600), and Grave (1602). MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING
GROTIAN MOMENTS 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013).

17.

Id.

18.

Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International
Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67 (Hedley
Bull et al. eds., 1990).

19.

Id.; see also SCHARF, supra note 16.

20.

See Visit from the Child Mozart, 1763–1764, CHÂTEAU DE VERSAILLES,
https://en.chateauversailles.fr/discover/history/key-dates/visit-child-moza
rt-1763-1764 [https://perma.cc/C485-NANB].

21.

Miller, supra note 2.

22.

DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 7.

23.

Miller, supra note 2.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. Grotius was technically given the title of “Pensionary of Rotterdam,”
which is essentially the same position as Governor in the United States.
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Advocate-General Jérôme Bignon, declared that Grotius was “the most
learned man the world had known since Aristotle.”26
Grotius’s string of successes was interrupted in 1619, when a Dutch
Calvinist faction staged a coup d’état, and Grotius and other leading
reformers (known as “Remonstrants”) were charged with treason and
imprisoned in Loevestein Castle.27 During his confinement, Grotius had
access to a large collection of books and spent his time at Loevestein
deep in study.28 Two years later, with the help of his wife, Maria van
Reigersberg, Grotius was smuggled out of Loevestein in a large trunk
and made his way to Paris.29 There, supported by a pension from the
French government, Grotius spent the next few years writing his opus,
De Jure Belli ac Pacis, which was published by a Parisian press in
1625.30
De Jure Belli ac Pacis was written in a unique style for the day,
with “voluminous references to ancient, medieval, and early modern
works.”31 Grotius relies, in his words, on “the testimony of philosophers,
historians, poets, finally also of orators” to refute skepticism about
international law and bolster his case for an international society
governed by a system of norms.32 He did not write “a dry textbook for
law students but employed the ornaments of eloquence and wit . . .
wishing his work to be useful to practical men of affairs.”33 His style has
been described as “penned by a sanguine spirit confident in the triumph
of great principles even in a time of darkness, turmoil and confusion,
with a moral glow warming the ponderous masses of erudition with
which the author overlaid his thoughts.”34 The book’s content and style

26.

HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN
SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1917).

27.

Miller, supra note 2; see also Loevestein Castle, HOLLAND.COM,
https://www.holland.com/global/tourism/holland-stories/castles-andcountry-houses/loevestein-castle-1.htm [https://perma.cc/TJN7-GTFW].

28.

Miller, supra note 2.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.; HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES, from the
Prolegomena § 40, at 23 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey
trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 1925).

33.

DUMBAULD, supra note 1, at 76.

34.

Sir John MacDonell, Address Before the Grotius Society: The Influence
of Grotius (May 13, 1919), in 5 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY,
PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND WAR: PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY IN
THE YEAR 1919, at xvii, xxi (1919).
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struck a chord with political leaders and elites across the continent and
made Grotius a household name almost overnight.35
Over the next twenty years, Grotius authored five dozen other
books, but De Jure Belli ac Pacis was his masterpiece.36 The
proliferation of printing presses during the time rendered Grotius’s book
one of the earliest world-wide “best sellers.”37 During his lifetime and
in the years that followed, nearly one hundred editions and translations
of the book were published in Latin, Dutch, English, German, Italian,
Russian, and French.38 British author and statesman John Morley wrote
that “along with Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations [De Jure Belli
ac Pacis] ‘is one of the cardinal books of European history.’”39 American
diplomat John Foster stated in 1909 that “[i]t has been well said that
[De Jure Belli ac Pacis] is one of the few books that have changed the
history of the world.”40
Grotius tried to return to the Netherlands in 1631, but the Dutch
authorities refused to issue him a pardon and placed a bounty on his
head.41 He then lived briefly in Hamburg, Germany.42 In 1634, Grotius
accepted an appointment by Sweden (one of the superpowers of midseventeenth-century Europe allied against Spain) to be the Ambassador
to France—a position he held until just before his death eleven years
later.43 His principal diplomatic accomplishment was helping to
negotiate a treaty which brought France fully into the Thirty Years’
War on the side of Sweden and the Protestant German princes, leading
to the defeat of the Habsburg cause and the Peace of Westphalia
thirteen years later.44 Grotius would die of illness following a shipwreck
on the way from Stockholm to Germany in 1645, while the Peace of
Westphalia was under negotiation.45

35.

See Miller, supra note 2.

36.

Id.

37.

See Richard Tuck, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR
AND PEACE, at x (Richard Tuck ed., 2005).

38.

Id.

39.

Bull, supra note 18, at 71.

40.

Foster, supra note 12, at 153.

41.

See Miller, supra note 2.

42.

Andrew Blom, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://iep.utm.edu/grotius/ [https://perma.cc/4K4M-A9LS].

43.

Id.

44.

See generally Hamilton Vreeland Jr., Hugo Grotius Diplomatist, 11 AM. J.
INT’L L. 580 (1917) (discussing Grotius’s diplomatic maneuvering between
France and Sweden).

45.

Bull, supra note 18, at 67; Blom, supra note 42.
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B. De Jure Belli ac Pacis

In the American Society of International Law’s inaugural Grotius
Lecture, Judge Christopher Weeramantry of the International Court of
Justice observed that “[i]t was an unprecedented situation that faced
the newly emerging states of Grotius’s time.”46 The medieval era, which
the Thirty Years’ War brought to a bloody end, had been characterized
by “criss-crossing political, legal, religious and moral allegiances” to
feudal rulers, to the Holy Roman Empire, and to the Catholic Church.47
Thus, according to Judge Weeramantry, “[d]etached from their
traditional moorings to church, empire, and a higher law, [these new
states] were groping for new principles of conduct and interrelationship
to provide a compass for the tempestuous waters that lay ahead.”48
Grotius sought to provide the nations of Europe with what they
badly needed in the closing years of the Thirty Years’ War—“a rational
theory of international relations emancipated from theology and the
authority of churches.”49 He was among the first to suggest how the
binding force of the law of nations could be preserved and made vital
in the kind of anarchic and pluralistic environment that would emerge
two decades later from the Peace of Westphalia.50
In explaining the motivation for writing De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
Grotius writes in the book’s Prolegomena:
Fully convinced . . . that there is a common law among nations,
which is valid alike for war and in war, I have had many and
weighty reasons for undertaking to write upon this subject.
Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in
relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed
of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause
at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no
longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in
accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose
for the committing of all crimes.51

46.

Christopher G. Weeramantry, The Grotius Lecture Series, 14 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 1515, 1516 (1999).

47.

Mark W. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius,
in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 392 (Ronald St. John MacDonald
ed., 1994).

48.

Weeramantry, supra note 46, at 1516.

49.

R.W. LEE, HUGO GROTIUS 57 (1930).

50.

EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM
AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 2 (2002).

51.

GROTIUS, supra note 32, at Prolegomena § 29.
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Grotius further explains that his book was meant as a response to
“those who view [international law] with contempt as having no reality
except an empty name.”52
At the time that Grotius wrote De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
Machiavellianism had for a century been the prevailing philosophical
approach to inter-State relations.53 In The Prince, Niccolò Machiavelli
justified the State as a self-sufficient, non-moral entity, and advocated
a worldview where international agreements are viewed as no more than
temporary arrangements of mutual convenience.54 During Grotius’s
time, “the empire was decaying, the church was corrupted and
intolerant, and . . . the Pope encouraged international faithlessness by
absolving treaty makers from their oaths.”55
Seeing the devastation of the Eighty Years’ War and Thirty Years’
War as confirmation of the folly of the Machiavellian method, Grotius
sought to replace it with a notion that States could exist in an
international community governed by treaties, which natural law
obligated them to honor.56 Grotius’s book stresses mutual
interdependence of States, asserting that there is no State so powerful
that it may not at some time require the help of others outside itself,
either for trade or mutual defense.57 This principle that agreements
should be carried out—pacta sunt servanda—which Grotius advocated,
has been described as the grundnorm of modern international law.58
De Jure Belli ac Pacis does not contain any direct reference to
Machiavelli; rather Grotius uses the Greek philosopher Carneades as
his foil.59 Nevertheless, “it is principally against Machiavelli that
Grotius directs his argument.”60 And while others—in particular the
sixteenth century Spanish theologians, Vitoria and Suarez61—had laid
the foundations for this approach, Grotius’s unique contribution was
52.

Id. § 3.

53.

C. Van Vollenhoven, Grotius and the Study of Law, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 1,
3–4 (1925).

54.

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 64 (Lerner ed.,
1950).

55.

Hamilton Vreeland, Jr., Hugo Grotius, 67 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 203,
204 (1919).

56.

GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. II, chs. XI, XII; see also Janis, supra note
47, at 396.

57.

GROTIUS, supra note 32, at Prolegomena § 23.

58.

MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE FORMATION
LAW 183 (1998).

59.

See, e.g., GROTIUS, supra note 32, at Prolegomena § 7.

60.

W.J. Korab-Karpowiez, In Defense of International Order: Grotius’s
Critique of Machiavellism, 60 REV. METAPHYSICS 55, 57 (2006).

61.

Janis, supra note 47, at 395.
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that he “secularized” international law, fashioning a system that would
appeal to Catholics, Protestants, and those outside the Christian
tradition alike.62 It was partly for this reason that the Catholic Church
banned Grotius’s book for nearly 275 years.63
Although Grotius’s observations and arguments were not
completely original, De Jure Belli ac Pacis is said to have “commended
itself to the conscience of the age. It restated the wisdom of the ancients
and applied it to the unprecedented circumstances of the world of the
Renaissance and Reformation.”64 Yet Grotius, the experienced diplomat
and politician, was no mere idealist. He acknowledged that war was a
natural feature of inter-State relations.65 At the same time he advocated
for application of law to initiating war and to waging it once
commenced.66
Grotius organized De Jure Belli ac Pacis as three books, totaling
hundreds of pages.67 Following the Prolegomena, in which Grotius
articulates and defends his philosophical approach, Book I advances his
conception of war and natural justice, arguing that there are some
circumstances in which war is justifiable.68 Book II identifies three just
causes for war: self-defense, reparation of injury, and punishment.69 And
Book III takes up the question of what rules govern the conduct of war
once it has begun; Grotius argued that all parties to war are bound by
such rules, whether their cause is just or not.70
One can easily connect the dots from Book III of De Jure Belli ac
Pacis to President Lincoln’s 1863 “Lieber Code”—the first codified laws
62.

Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1946). Grotius writes: “A question frequently
raised concerning treaties is whether they are lawfully entered into with
those who are strangers to the true religion. According to the law of nature
this is in no degree a matter of doubt. For the right to enter into treaties
is so common to all men that it does not admit of a distinction arising
from religion.” GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. II, ch. 15, § 8.

63.

Pope Urban VIII placed De Jure Belli ac Pacis on the Papal Index on
February 4, 1627, and it was forbidden to all Catholics until the ban was
lifted in 1901 by Pope Leo XIII following the Papal delegation’s exclusion
from the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 in response to the ban of a book
that contained the foundational principles of international law. VREELAND,
supra note 26, at 167.

64.

Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J.
INT’L L. 477, 482 (1982).

65.

SCHARF, supra note 16, at 21.

66.

Id.

67.

See Blom, supra note 42.

68.

GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. I.

69.

See id. at bk. 2.

70.

See id. at bk. 3.
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for the conduct of war;71 to the Martens Clause in the Hague
Convention of 1899—the natural law-inspired provision of the first
multinational convention codifying the laws of war;72 and ultimately to
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949—the comprehensive set of modern
rules for warfare.73 At a commemoration of Grotius during the 1899
Hague Peace Conference, the American representative, Andrew White,
stated:
Of all works not claiming divine inspiration, [De Jure Belli ac
Pacis], by a man proscribed and hated both for his politics and
his religion, has proved the greatest blessing to humanity. More
than any other it has prevented unmerited suffering, misery and
sorrow; more than any other it has promoted the blessings of
peace and diminished the horrors of war.74
C. The Grotian Legacy

De Jure Belli ac Pacis is celebrated for much more than providing
the scholarly underpinning for the development of the laws of war.
Indeed, many scholars contend that Grotius’s famous book laid the
intellectual foundation for the general approach embodied in the Peace
of Westphalia, which ended the Eighty Years’ War and Thirty Years’

71.

See Andrew D. White, Debt Due to Hugo Grotius, 61 ADVOC. OF PEACE
186, 186, 186–90 (1899) (reprinting White’s address delivered on July 4,
1899, in Deft, Holland, at the celebration given by the American
Commission in honor of Grotius). General Orders No. 100: Instructions for
the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863),
reprinted in 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 245,
247–74 (1881).

72.

The Martens Clause is a catch-all provision of the Hague Regulations
(repeated in the 1907 Hague Convention) that provides: “Until a more
complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and
the requirements of the public conscience.” JAMES B. SCOTT, THE HAGUE
PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 113 (1909).

73.

See generally GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. III; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287.

74.

White, supra note 71, at 189.
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War in 1648 and inaugurated the modern international legal system.75
As James Bryce writes:
When by the Peace of Westphalia a crowd of petty principalities
were recognized as practically independent states, the need of a
body of rules to regulate their relations and intercourse became
pressing. Such a code (if one may call it by that name) Grotius
and his successors compiled out of the principles which they found
in the Roman law, then the private law of Germanic countries,
thus laying the foundation whereon the system of international
jurisprudence has been built up during the last three centuries.76

The Peace of Westphalia was history’s first general peace
settlement, resulting from a six-year diplomatic conference with 109
participating delegations, including the Holy Roman Emperor, the
House of Habsburg, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of France, the
Swedish Empire, the Dutch Republic, the Princes of the Holy Roman
Empire, and sovereigns of the free imperial cities.77 The agreement was
embodied in two separate accords: the Treaty of Osnabrück concluded
between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and her allies on the one side,
and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on
the other;78 and the Treaty of Münster concluded between the Catholic
King of France and his allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman
Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other.79
Aside from establishing fixed territorial boundaries for many of the
countries involved in the conflict, the important provisions of these
treaties were the recognition of the independent sovereignty of the
States of Europe; 80 their right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within
their own territories;81 the establishment of religious toleration;82 the
right of each State to negotiate its own treaties;83 and the recognition

75.

SCHARF, supra note 16, at 22.

76.

JAMES BRYCE, THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 436 (Norwood Press 1907).

77.

See generally R. B. MOWAT, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 1451–1789,
at 104–14 (1928) (tracing the diplomatic negotiation of the Peace of
Westphalia).

78.

Id.

79.

For the full text of the Osnabrück and Münster Treaties, in both their Latin
and English versions, see 1 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 119, 270 (C.
Parry, ed., 1969).

80.

MOWAT, supra note 77.

81.

See id.

82.

Peace of Westphalia, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/
Peace-of-Westphalia [https://perma.cc/AF94-BHA5].

83.

Id.
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that such treaties were binding.84 The Peace of Westphalia changed the
relationship of subjects to their rulers.85 In earlier times, people had
tended to have overlapping political and religious loyalties.86 Through
Westphalia, it was agreed that the citizenry of a respective nation were
to be subjected first and foremost to the laws and whims of their own
respective government rather than to those of neighboring powers, be
they religious or secular.87 This allowed the rulers of the Imperial States
to independently decide their religious worship, and it reaffirmed the
authority of the State over the church. Protestants and Catholics were
redefined as equal before the law, Calvinism was given legal recognition,
and neither the Pope nor the Holy Roman Emperor was permitted to
interfere with the administration of the independent States.88
The conventional view is that by recognizing the German Princes
as sovereign, with the right to negotiate their own treaties which would
be binding upon them, the Peace of Westphalia signaled the beginning
of a new era reflecting the Grotian conception of international
community regulated by universal principles.89 Thus, one of the primary
authors of the United States Constitution, James Madison, declared
that Grotius “is not unjustly considered . . . the father of the modern
code of nations.”90 Stephen Field, one of the most eminent of
nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court Justices, similarly proclaimed
Grotius to be the “father” of modern international law, a moniker that
has been repeated by other high court judges.91 More recently, Professor
David Bederman of Emory University School of Law wrote that Grotius
certainly “earned” the title “father of international law,” and major
international statesmen and women of the 21st century—former U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson and former U.N.

84.

See id.

85.

See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20,
22–23 (1948), for a discussion of the expanded liberties that subjects of the
European monarchies received after the Peace of Westphalia, both in its
immediate aftermath and for centuries to come.

86.

See, e.g., Thirty Years’ War, supra note 10.

87.

See, e.g., SCHARF, supra note 16, at 23.

88.

See Murphy, supra note 64, at 478–79.

89.

But cf. Stéphane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy—Myth or
Reality?, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 148 (2000) (describing an emerging critique
of this conventional view).

90.

JAMES MADISON, An Examination of the British Doctrine, Which Subjects
to Capture a Neutral Trade, Not Open in Time of Peace, in 2 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1794–1815, at 229, 234 (1865).

91.

Charles J. Reid, Jr., Hugo Grotius—A Case of Dubious Paternity, U. ST.
THOMAS L. LEGAL STUD. RSCH. PAPER NO. 07–13, at 109 (2009).
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Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to name two—have made
similar pronouncements.92
To those who accept this view of history, the year 1648 marked a
fundamental turning point for international law and relations. In light
of the intellectual foundations Grotius provided for this historic
development, we could call it the first “Grotian Moment” in
international law.
This view of the Peace of Westphalia as a sudden paradigmshifting93 event inspired by the writings of Grotius is not entirely
accurate, however. While co-existing with empires, the State system
had emerged a hundred years before Westphalia.94 Moreover, the power
to conclude alliances formally recognized at Westphalia was not
unqualified, and was in fact a power that the German Princes had
already possessed for almost half a century.95 Furthermore, although
the treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the
Empire remained a key actor according to the terms of the treaties.96
For example, the Imperial Diet retained the powers of legislation,
warfare, and taxation, and it was through Imperial bodies, such as the
Diet and the Courts, that religious safeguards mandated by the Treaty
were imposed on the German Princes.97
These nuances are perhaps beside the point. While the results of
Westphalia may have been simplified by the lens of history, and
Grotius’s role may have been exaggerated,98 Westphalia has
unquestionably emerged as a symbolic marker and Grotius as an
emblematic figure of changing historical thought. To understand how
and why that perception has grown to be more important than reality,
one can turn to the theory of semiotics.99 Derived from the Greek word
semesion, meaning sign, semiotics was developed by Charles Peirce in
the nineteenth century as the study of how meaning of signs, symbols,
92.

David J. Bederman, World Law Transcendent, 54 EMORY L.J. 53, 55 (2005);
Mary Robinson, The Fifth Annual Grotius Lecture Shaping Globalization:
The Role of Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2003); Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1609, 1609 (1995).

93.

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 150 (1970)
(coining the phrase paradigm shift).

94.

Stéphane Beaulac, The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law:
Challenging the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 205 (2004).

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 208.

97.

Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV.
J. INT’L L. 373, 375 n.20; Beaulac, supra note 89, at 167–68.

98.

KEENE, supra note 50, at 45–52.

99.

Halina Sendera Mohd. Yakin & Andreas Totu, The Semiotic Perspectives
and Saussure: A Brief Comparative Study, 155 SOC. & BEHAV. SCIS. 4, 4
(2014).
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and language is constructed and understood.100 Semiotics begins with
the assumption that phrases, such as “the Peace of Westphalia” or “the
Grotian tradition,” are not historic artifacts whose meanings remain
static over time.101 Rather, semiotics posits that the meanings of such
terms change over the years along with the interpretive community or
communities.102 Thus, the legend and mystique that surround Grotius
and the Peace of Westphalia have attained their own significance, by
which Grotius is now widely viewed as “the patron saint of the modern
states-system.”103 The fact that the legend suffers from historical
inaccuracy does not diminish its usefulness as a metaphor for critical
turning points in international law and relations.104
Ultimately, the Grotian tradition,105 while widely acclaimed, proved
incapable of bringing order and stability to the destructive rivalries
inherent in the nation-state system.106 And in the centuries after the
publication of his celebrated book, Grotius’s reputation experienced
great decline during the rise of positivism, and later of anti-colonialism,
in international law.107 Yet, there has been renewed interest in the
salience of Grotius’s political thought to the world of today. Although
Grotius did not foresee the advent of an international organization like
the United Nations, he did envision a community of nations, and his
just war approach is reflected in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.108
His concept that international law might properly be enforced through
punishment by third States109 anticipated the collective sanctions
schemes of the League of Nations and U.N. Charter. His natural law
approach presaged the modern concept of jus cogens—peremptory
100. Id.
101. See Dan Li, Critical Media Literacy: A Social Semiotic Analysis and
Multimodal Discourse of Corporacy, 19 INT’L J. EDUC. ARTS, Sept. 25, 2018,
at 1, 4.
102. See 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE: PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM (Charles Hartshorne & Paul
Weiss eds., 1935); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 8 (1976).
103. MARTINE JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS,
NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST
INDIES 1595–1615, at xxxviii (2006).
104. SCHARF, supra note 16, at 26.
105. Lauterpacht, supra note 62, at 19; MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER
AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
106. Murphy, supra note 64, at 492.
107. Edward Keene, The Reception of Hugo Grotius in International Relations
Theory, 20/21 GROTIANA 135, 154 (1999); KEENE, supra note 50, at 33; A.
Claire Cutler, The ‘Grotian Tradition’ in International Relations, 17 REV.
INT’L STUD. 41, 54 (1991).
108. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
109. GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. II, ch. XX, §§ XX, XL.
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norms as to which States cannot by treaty derogate.110 Grotius’s
justification for humanitarian intervention (he argues that the State
that is oppressive and egregiously violates basic human rights forfeits
its moral claim to full sovereignty),111 is at the heart of the modern
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. His notion that individuals and
non-State actors could be subjects of international law112 is relevant to
modern human rights law and international criminal law, as well as
notions of self-defense against terrorist groups.113 And his defense of the
force of international law is used today to dispute neo-realist claims
that international law is not binding.114
While Grotius’s contributions go back nearly 500 years, the term
“Grotian Moment” is a relatively recent creation, coined by Princeton
Professor Richard Falk in 1985.115 Since then, scholars and even the
U.N. Secretary-General have employed the term in a variety of ways,116
but even more frequently it has been used to denote a transformative
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary
international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance.117
Usually this happens during “a period in world history that seems
analogous at least to the end of European feudalism . . . when new

110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (defining jus cogens norms as laws such as the prohibitions
on the use of force and genocide “accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole . . . from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”).
111. GROTIUS, supra note 32, at bk. II, ch. II, § XIX.
112. Id. at bk. I, ch. I, § I; id. at bk. III, ch. XXIII, § II.
113. Yaroslav Shiryaev, The Right of Armed Self-Defense in International Law
and Self-Defense Arguments Used in the Second Lebanon War, 31 ACTA
SOCIETATIS MARTENSIS 80, 93 (2007/2008).
114. O’CONNELL, supra note 105, at 3.
115. Richard Falk, Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law and
Future Prospects, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 399, 408–09 (1981). For the early
seeds of this concept of a changing paradigm in Falk’s work, see Richard
A. Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of
International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 32 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969).
116. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 92, at 1613 (referring to the establishment of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as part of
the process of building a new international system for the 21st century).
117. Saul Mendlovitz & Merav Datan, Judge Weeramantry’s Grotian Quest, 7
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 402 (1997) (defining the term
“Grotian moment”); Milena Sterio, Humanitarian Intervention PostSyria: A Grotian Moment?, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 344 (2014).
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norms, procedures, and institutions had to be devised to cope with the
then decline of the Church and the emergence of the secular state.”118

III. The Grotian Moment Concept
A. Defining and Identifying Grotian Moments

Professor Myres McDougal famously described the customary
international law formation process as one of continuous claim and
response.119 Out of this process of claim and response, and third-party
State support, acquiescence or repudiation, rules emerge or are
superseded.120 Just “as pearls are produced by the irritant of a piece of
grit entering an oyster’s shell, so the interactions and mutual
accommodations of States produce the pearl—so to speak—of
customary law.”121 Like the slow creation of a pearl, usually this process
of customary international law formation takes many decades.122 Under
the traditional view, the formation of customary rules is so gradual that
it is often described as “crystallization.”123 But sometimes, world events

118. BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1369
(3d ed. 1997); B.S. Chimni, A Just World Under Law: A View from the
South, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 199, 201 (2007).
119. See generally Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen
Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J.
648 (1955) (tracing the history of America’s decision to test atomic bombs
in the late 1940s and 1950s, when it was unprecedented in international
relations).
120. Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of International Law, 20 ILSA
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 314 (2014).
121. MENDELSON, supra note 58, at 195.
122. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articulation
Theories: An Economic Analysis, GEO. MASON UNIV. L., WORKING PAPER
NO. 02–24, at 5 (2000), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications
/working_papers/02-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6ZX-6APM]; G.I. Tunkin,
Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms in International Law,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 419, 420 (1961); Manley O. Hudson, Article 24 of the
Statute of the International Law Commission, Ways and Means for Making
the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available, [1950]
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24, U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/16.
123. SCHARF, supra note 16, at 211.
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are such that customary international law develops quite rapidly.124
Those instances have come to be known as “Grotian Moments.”125
By tradition, jurists and scholars have looked exclusively to two
factors: (1) widespread State practice, and (2) manifestations of a
conviction that the practice is required or permitted by law—to decide
whether an emergent rule has attained customary international law
status.126 The Grotian Moment concept compels consideration of a third
factor—a context of fundamental change—that can serve as an
accelerating agent, enabling customary international law to form much
more rapidly and with less positive State practice than is normally the
case.
B. The Importance of Customary International Law

To understand the significance of the Grotian Moment concept, one
must begin by recognizing the continuing vigor of customary
international law. To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of
customary international law are greatly exaggerated.127 Despite its
widespread codification in treaties during the last century, the
unwritten norms, rules, and principles of customary law continue to
play a crucial role in international relations.128 There are three primary
reasons for customary international law’s ongoing vitality.
124. Rapid formation of customary international law during a Grotian Moment
is not the same as so-called “instant custom.” Both State practice and
opinio juris are required, though the time period may be quite brief. Int’l
Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary
International Law, with Commentaries, U.N. DOC. A/73/10, at 138, 122,
136 (2018) (“Provided that the practice is general, no particular duration
is required.”) [hereinafter Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Conclusions]; North
Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Merits, 1969 I.C.J. 3,
¶¶ 71, 73–74 (Feb. 20).
125. See generally SCHARF, supra note 16, at 212; MICHAEL P. SCHARF ET AL.,
THE SYRIAN CONFLICT’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2020).
Other scholars have called these international constitutional moments.
See e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other
Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1206
(2007) (describing Nuremberg as an international “constitutional
moment”); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An
International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1–2 (2002)
(describing 9/11 as an “international constitutional moment”).
126. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Conclusions, supra note 124, at 123.
127. Mark Twain (Samuel Longhorne Clemens), Cable from London to the
Associated Press (1897), in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 625 (Emily
Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980); David Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection
and the Death of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L.
31, 43 (2010).
128. Their definitions vary, but in ordinary usage the terms norms, principles
and rules of customary international law are often used interchangeably,
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First, in some ways, customary international law possesses more
jurisprudential power than does treaty law. Unlike treaties, which bind
only the parties thereto, once a norm is established as customary
international law, it is binding on all States, even those new to a type
of activity, so long as they did not persistently object during its
formation.129 Since some international law rules co-exist in treaties and
custom, customary international law expands the reach of the rules to
those States that have not yet ratified the treaty. In addition, the
customary international law status of the rules can apply to actions of
the treaty parties that pre-dated the entry into force of the treaty.130
Moreover, States that were not even in existence at the time the norm
evolved, such as colonies or former parts of a larger State, and therefore
never had an opportunity to express their positions as a particular rule
emerged, are nonetheless generally deemed to be bound by the entire
corpus of customary international law existing upon the date they
become sovereign States.131 Finally, unlike some treaties which by their
terms permit withdrawal, customary international law does not
recognize a unilateral right to withdraw from it.132
Second, while one might tend to think of customary international
law as growing only slowly, in contrast to the more rapid formation of
treaties, the actual practice of the world community in modern times
suggests that the reverse is more often the case. For example,
negotiations for the Law of the Sea Convention began in 1973, the
Convention was concluded in 1982, and did not enter into force until it
received its sixtieth ratification in 1994—a period of twenty-one

as they are here. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules,
Principles, and the Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation,
23 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 275, 276 (2007).
129. INT’L L. ASS’N, LONDON CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL)
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 27 (2000).
130. SCHARF, supra note 16, at 30.
131. David Koplow, U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Rsch., International Legal
Standards and the Weaponization of Outer Space, in SPACE: THE NEXT
GENERATION—CONFERENCE REPORT, 159, 161 (2008).
132. Professors Bradley and Gulati criticize customary international law for
failing to recognize a right to subsequently withdrawal from a customary
rule in parallel with the right to withdraw from a treaty. See Curtis A.
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2010).
Note, however, that not all treaties permit withdrawal. Moreover, there are
situations, such as in a fundamental change of circumstances, where a State
can be excused for failing to comply with a customary rule. HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
271, 271 (1933).
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years.133 Similarly, negotiations for the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties began in 1949, the Convention was concluded in 1969, and
did not enter into force until it received its thirty-fifth ratification in
1980—some thirty-one years.134 And the International Law Commission
(“ILC”) began its work on the Statute for an International Criminal
Court in 1949; several preparatory committees then worked on it, and
it was finally concluded in Rome in 1998 and entered into force upon
receipt of its sixtieth ratification in 2002—a span of fifty-three years
from start to finish.135 As we shall see below, customary international
law often forms at a much faster pace, especially with respect to areas
of technological or other fundamental change.136
Finally, while one might assume that treaty law offers the benefit
of greater clarity and precision in the articulation of the legal
obligations, this is not always the case. Rather, the provisions of
treaties, especially multinational conventions, are also often subject to
what H. L. A. Hart called a “penumbra of uncertainty”137 resulting from
the need to bridge language, cultural, legal, and political divides
between diverse parties. In some areas, customary rules may provide
greater precision since they evolve in response to concrete situations
and cases, and are often articulated in the written decisions of
international courts.138
C. Nuremberg as the Prototypical Grotian Moment

During a sabbatical in the fall of 2008, the author of this article
had the privilege of serving as Special Assistant to the International
Prosecutor of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(“ECCC”), the tribunal created by the U.N. and government of
Cambodia to prosecute the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge for the
133. John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention:
Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.
J., no. 1, 2005, at 5–6.
134. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 110.
135. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS
(1998), https://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm [https://perma.cc
/MNU2-EYT7].
136. In contrast to earlier times, in the modern era of instantaneous electronic
communications, and a proliferation of diplomatic conferences, organizations
and other forums for multinational diplomatic exchanges, state practice is
being generated at an increasing pace, while information about state practice
is becoming more and more widely disseminated over the internet. This
means that the requisite quantity of claims and responses can be reached
much more quickly than in the past leading to a general acceleration of the
formation of customary rules. Tullio Treves, Customary International Law,
MAX PLANCK ENCYC. PUB. INT’L L. (2012), ¶ 25.
137. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 12 (2d ed. 1994).
138. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Conclusions, supra note 124, at 20.
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atrocities committed during their reign of terror 1975 to 1979.139 While
in Phnom Penh, the author was assigned to write the Prosecutor’s
brief140 in response to the Defense Motion to Exclude Joint Criminal
Enterprise (“JCE”) liability as a mode of liability from the trial of the
five surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge.141
JCE is a form of liability somewhat similar to the Anglo-American
“felony murder rule”142 and “Pinkerton rule,”143 in which a person who
willingly participates in a criminal enterprise can be held criminally
responsible for the reasonably foreseeable acts of other members of the
criminal enterprise even if those acts were not part of the plan.
Originally called “common design” liability, it was first applied by an
international tribunal at Nuremberg following World War II.144
Although only a few countries around the world apply principles of coperpetration similar to the felony murder rule or Pinkerton rule,145 since
139. For background on the creation of the ECCC, see generally Michael P.
Scharf, Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence be
Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129 (2008).
140. Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Co-Prosecutors’
Supplementary Observations on Joint Criminal Enterprise (Dec. 31, 2008).
A year later, the Co-Investigating Judges ruled in favor of the Prosecution
that the ECCC could employ JCE liability for the international crimes
within its jurisdiction. See Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC/OCIJ, Order on the Application at the ECCC of the Form of
Liability Known as Joint Criminal Enterprise (Dec. 8, 2009).
141. Pursuant to the Co-Investigating Judges’ September 16, 2008 Order, the
Co-Prosecutors filed the brief to detail why the extended form of JCE
liability, “JCE III,” is applicable before the ECCC. The Defense Motion
argued in part that JCE III, as applied by the Tadić decision of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)
Appeals Chamber, is a judicial construct that does not exist in customary
international law or, alternatively, did not exist from 1975 to 1979. Case of
Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Ieng Sary’s Motion
Against the Application at the ECCC of the Form of Responsibility Known
as Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 29 (July 28, 2008).
142. For background about, and cases applying the felony murder doctrine, see
generally David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony
Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 (1985).
143. For background about, and cases applying the Pinkerton Rule, see generally
Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV.
1 (2005).
144. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major German War
Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, XV LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 97–98 (1949) (summarizing the jurisprudence of the
Nuremberg and Control Council Law Number 10 trials).
145. The French and Dutch concept of “association de malfaiteurs” is
somewhat similar to JCE. The Indian Penal Code imposes individual
liability for unlawful acts committed by several persons in furtherance of
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the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the 1999 Tadić case,146 it has
been accepted that JCE is a mode of liability applicable to international
criminal trials. Dozens of cases before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have recognized
and applied JCE liability during the last twenty-five years.147
These modern precedents, however, were not relevant to the
Cambodia Tribunal because the crimes under its jurisdiction had
occurred some twenty years earlier. Under the international law
principle of nullum crimen sine lege148 (the equivalent to the U.S.
Constitution’s ex post facto law prohibition), the Cambodia Tribunal
could only apply the substantive law and associated modes of liability
that existed as part of customary international law in 1975.149
Therefore, the question at the heart of the Prosecution’s Brief was
whether the Nuremberg Tribunal precedent and the U.N.’s adoption of
the “Nuremberg Principles” were sufficient to establish JCE liability as
part of customary international law following World War II.
The attorneys for the Khmer Rouge Defendants argued that
Nuremberg and its progeny provided too scant a sampling to constitute
the widespread State practice and opinio juris required to establish JCE
as a customary norm as of 1975.150 In response, the Prosecution Brief
a common plan. And the Canadian Criminal Code punishes persons who
“form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose.” SCHARF,
supra note 16, at 70 n.20.
146. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
147. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal
Judgment, ¶ 80 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28,
2005); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the
Preliminary Motions by the Defence Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation
to Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 14,
2004); CDF Case, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Motions for
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 130 (Special Court for
Sierra Leone Oct. 21, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Interlocutory Decision
on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration,
Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/1, ¶¶ 259–61 (Special Trib.
for Lebanon Appeals Chamber Feb. 16, 2011).
148. Nullum crimen sine lege, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/nullum_crimen_sine_lege [https://perma.cc/X5XD-DF45].
149. Case of Ieng Sary, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, Ieng Sary’s
Motion Against the Application the ECCC of the Form of Responsibility
Known as Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 33 (Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia July 28, 2008).
150. Id. ¶¶ 18–24. For the definition of “customary international law,” see
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20).
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maintained that Nuremberg constituted “a Grotian Moment”—an
instance in which there is such a fundamental change to the
international system that a new principle of customary international
law can arise with exceptional velocity.151 Despite the dearth of State
practice, the Cambodia Tribunal ultimately found JCE applicable to
its trials based on the Nuremberg precedent and U.N. General
Assembly endorsement of the Nuremberg Principles.152
While the Nuremberg trials were not without criticism, there can
be no question that Nuremberg represented a paradigm-shifting153
development in international law. The ILC has recognized that the
Nuremberg Charter and Judgment gave birth to the entire international
paradigm of individual criminal responsibility.154 Prior to Nuremberg,
the concept of international criminal responsibility of individuals did
not exist, and what a State did to its own citizens within its own
borders was deemed its own business.155 Nuremberg fundamentally
altered that conception. “International law now protects individual
citizens against abuses of power by their governments [and] imposes
individual liability on government officials who commit grave war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”156 The ILC has
described the principle of individual responsibility and punishment for
crimes under international law recognized at Nuremberg as the
“cornerstone of international criminal law” and the “enduring legacy of
the Charter and Judgment of the [Nuremberg] Tribunal.”157
Importantly, on December 11, 1946, in one of the first actions of
the newly formed United Nations, the General Assembly unanimously
151. Scharf, supra note 120, at 332.
152. In Case 002, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber later confirmed that JCE I
and JCE II reflected customary international law as of 1976 but
questioned whether JCE III was actually applied at Nuremberg, and
therefore was not applicable to the ECCC trial. Case No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC/TC, Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges’
on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), ¶ 45 (Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia Pre-Trial Chamber May 20, 2010).
153. As defined by Thomas Kuhn, a paradigm shift is a change in the basic
assumptions within the ruling theory of science. While Kuhn opined that
the term should be confined to the context of pure science, it has since
been widely used in numerous nonscientific contexts to describe a
profound change in a fundamental model or perception of events. See
KUHN, supra note 93, at 138.
154. Scharf, supra note 16, at 65.
155. Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility
Under International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531, 536–37 (1999).
156. Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 125, at 13.
157. See Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Forty-Eight Session (May 6–July 26, 1996), U.N. Doc. A/51/10,
at 19 (1996).
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affirmed the principles from the Nuremberg Charter and judgments in
Resolution 95(I).158 This General Assembly Resolution had all the
attributes of a resolution entitled to great weight as a declaration of
customary international law159: It was labeled an “affirmation” of legal
principles; it dealt with inherently legal questions; it was passed by a
unanimous vote; and none of the members expressed the position that
it was merely a political statement.160
Despite the fact that Nuremberg and its Control Council Law No.
10 progeny consisted of only a dozen separate cases tried by a handful
of courts over a period of just three years, the ICJ,161 the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,162 the European Court of
Human Rights,163 and several domestic courts164 have cited the General
158. G.A. Res. 95(I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, at 188 (Dec. 11,
1946).
159. In deciding whether to treat a particular General Assembly resolution as
evidence of an emergent rule of customary international law, the
International Court of Justice has stated that “it is necessary to look at
its content and the conditions of its adoption.” Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 255 (July 8).
For a discussion of and authorities related to the importance of wording,
vote outcome, and explanation of votes in this regard, see SCHARF, supra
note 16, at 54–56.
160. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, supra note 158, at 188.
161. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 172 (July 9).
162. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Opinion and Judgment,
Trial Chamber, ¶ 623 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7,
1997); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 141 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
163. The European Court of Human Rights recognized the “universal validity”
of the Nuremberg principles in Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, which stated:
Although the Nuremberg Tribunal was established for trying the
major war criminals of the European Axis countries for the
offences they had committed before or during the Second World
War, the Court notes that the universal validity of the principles
concerning crimes against humanity was subsequently confirmed
by, inter alia, resolution 95 of the United Nations General
Assembly (11 December 1946) and later by the International Law
Commission.
Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, App. No. 23052/04, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399,
410 (2006).
164. The General Assembly resolution affirming the Nuremberg Principles has
been cited as evidence of customary international law in cases in Canada,
Bosnia, France, and Israel. See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 709–10
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Assembly Resolution affirming the principles of the Nuremberg Charter
and judgments as an authoritative declaration of customary
international law.
Nuremberg, then, represented a prototypical Grotian Moment. The
Tribunal’s formation was in response to the most heinous atrocity in
the history of humankind—the extermination of six million Jews and
several million other “undesirables” by the Nazi regime.165 From a
conventional view of customary international law formation, the
amount of State practice was quite limited, consisting only of the
negotiation of the Nuremberg Charter by four States, its accession by
nineteen others, the judgment of the Tribunal, and a General Assembly
Resolution endorsing (though not enumerating) its principles.166
Moreover, the time period from the end of the war to the General
Assembly endorsement of the Nuremberg Principles was a mere year, a
drop in the bucket compared to the amount of time it ordinarily takes
to crystallize customary international law. Yet, despite the limited
State practice and minimal time, the ICJ, European Court of Human
Rights, and four international criminal tribunals have confirmed that
the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment immediately ripened into
customary international law.167
The Grotian Moment concept rationalizes this outcome. Nuremberg
reflected a novel solution to unprecedented atrocity in the context of
history’s most devastating war. Beyond the Nuremberg trial, there was
a great need for universal implementation of the Nuremberg
Principles.168 Yet, on the eve of the Cold War, it was clear that a widely
ratified multilateral convention would not be a practicable near-term
solution. In fact, it would take half a century before the international
community was able to conclude a widely ratified treaty transforming
the Nuremberg model into a permanent International Criminal Court.169
It is this context of fundamental change and great need for a timely
response that explains how Nuremberg could so quickly and universally
be accepted as customary international law.

(Can.); Prosecutor v. Vrdoljak, No. X-KR-08/488, Court of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (July 10, 2008); Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the
Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to
Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289 (1994)
(summarizing the Touvier and Barbie cases in French courts).
165. SCHARF, supra note 16, at 67.
166. Scharf, supra note 120, at 334.
167. See supra notes 76–90.
168. Scharf, supra note 120.
169. Id. at 334–45.
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D. Examples of Grotian Moments Since World War II

As the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law has
observed, “[r]ecent developments show . . . that customary rules may
come into existence rapidly.”170 The venerable publication goes on to
explain:
This can be due to the urgency of coping with new developments
of technology, such as, for instance, drilling technology as regards
the rules on the continental shelf, or space technology as regards
the rule on the freedom of extra-atmospheric space . . . Or it may
be due to the urgency of coping with widespread sentiments of
moral outrage regarding crimes committed in conflicts such as
those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia . . . that brought about the
rapid formation of a set of customary rules concerning crimes
committed in internal conflicts.171

These are not the only examples of Grotian Moments since World
War II, but each follow the pattern of Nuremberg. Let us examine each
of these examples in turn, beginning with the rapid formation of the
law of the continental shelf. In 1945, U.S. President Truman issued a
proclamation that the resources on the continental shelf off the coast
of the United States belonged to the United States.172 This represented
a major departure from the existing customary international law of the
sea, under which the seabed outside of twelve nautical miles was
considered free for exploitation by any State.173 The Truman
Proclamation was driven by technological developments enabling
exploitation of offshore oil and gas supplies and the intense post-war
demand for such resources for a rebuilding world.174 Though the United
States recognized that it was acting as a custom pioneer,175 it was
careful to couch its justification in legal terms that would render the
action easier to accept and replicate by other States. Despite the farreaching change it represented, the Truman Proclamation was met with
no protest;176 rather, within five years, thirty coastal States had made

170. Treves, supra note 136, ¶ 24; accord INT’L L. ASS’N, supra note 129, at 20.
171. Treves, supra note 136, ¶ 24.
172. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
173. See BARRY BUZAN, SEABED POLITICS 8 (1976).
174. Id. at 7; see also JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES
4 (1992).
175. ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 30
(1981) (citing unpublished manuscripts on file with the National Archives
and Records information).
176. BUZAN, supra note 173, at 8.
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similar claims to the resources of their continental shelves,177 leading
commentators to declare that the continental shelf concept had become
virtually instant customary international law.178 By 1969, the ICJ had
confirmed that the Truman Proclamation quickly generated customary
international law binding on States that had not ratified the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.179
Next, let us look at the formation of outer space law, which rapidly
emerged from the great leaps in rocket technology in the 1960s, led by
the Soviet Union and the United States, inaugurating the era of space
flight.180 Rather than treat outer space like the high seas (open to
unregulated exploitation), the international community embraced a
unique set of rules to govern this new area as codified in the General
Assembly Declaration on Outer Space, which was unanimously
approved in 1963.181 Though the amount of State practice was limited
to a few dozen space flights launched by two States and the lack of
protest by the States over which these rockets passed, States and
scholars have concluded that the 1963 Declaration represented an
authoritative statement of customary international law that rapidly
formed in response to new technologies requiring a new international
law paradigm.182
Finally, let us turn to the customary international humanitarian
law that rapidly emerged from the Yugoslavia Tribunal in the 1990s.
The establishment of the Yugoslavia Tribunal was made possible
because of a unique constellation of events at the end of the Cold War,
which included the break-up of the Soviet Union,183 Russia’s assumption
of the Soviet seat in the Security Council,184 and the return of genocide

177. MORELL, supra note 174, at 2.
178. Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 376, 376–77 (1950).
179. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germ. v. Den. & Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. 3, ¶ 47 (Feb. 20).
180. SCHARF ET AL., supra note 125, at 27.
181. G.A. Res. 1280 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, at 15 (Nov.
27, 1963).
182. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE
CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 138 (1972).

IN

183. See generally The Collapse of the Soviet Union, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union
[https://perma.cc/RVQ7-GXYF].
184. See generally Yehuda Z. Blum, Russia Takes over the Soviet Union’s Seat
at the United Nations, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 354 (1992).
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to Europe for the first time since Nazi Germany.185 In its inaugural case,
the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavia Tribunal rendered a
revolutionary decision that for the first time held that individuals could
be held criminally liable for violations of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions for war crimes
committed in internal conflict.186 This decision closed a gap in the
coverage of international humanitarian law and was soon thereafter
affirmed by the Rwanda Tribunal187 and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.188 It was codified in the 1998 Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which has been ratified by 123 States.189
While there are no legal consequences to calling something a
Grotian Moment, these case studies suggest that the Grotian Moment
concept has several practical applications. It can explain the rapid
formation of customary rules in times of flux, thereby imbuing those
rules with greater repute. It can counsel governments when to seek the
path of a U.N. General Assembly resolution as a means of facilitating
the formation of customary international law, and how to craft such a
resolution to ensure that it is viewed as a capstone in the formation of
such customary rules. It can, in apt circumstances, strengthen the case
for litigants arguing the existence of a new customary international rule.
It can also furnish international courts and international organizations
with the confidence to recognize new rules of customary international
law in appropriate cases, despite a relative paucity and short duration
of State practice. That is what happened in the case of use of force
against ISIS.
E. A Modern Grotian Moment: Use of Force Against Non-State Actors

Had the Max Plank Encyclopedia been written today, it would
likely have added the international community’s about-face on the
legality of the use of force against non-State actors as another example
of a Grotian Moment. In 2014, a militant group known as ISIS rapidly
185. See generally The Bosnian Genocide, MONTREAL HOLOCAUST MUSEUM,
https://museeholocauste.ca/en/resources-training/the-bosnian-genocide/
[https://perma.cc/B697-EBCP].
186. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
187. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc.
S/1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995).
188. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 3, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145.
189. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (distinguishing between “international armed conflict”
in paragraph 2(b) and “armed conflict not of an international character”
in paragraphs 2(c)–(f)).
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took over more than thirty percent of the territory of Syria and Iraq.190
In the process, it captured oil fields and refineries worth billions of U.S.
dollars,191 bank assets and antiquities,192 and tanks and armaments,193
and became one of the greatest threats to peace and security in the
Middle East.194 In an effort to “degrade and defeat” ISIS, the United
States, assisted by a handful of other Western and Arab countries,
launched thousands of bombing sorties and cruise missile attacks
against ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria starting in August 2014.195 While
the Iraqi government had consented to foreign military action against
ISIS within Iraq, the Syrian government did not consent to foreign
military action within its territory.196 Rather, Syria protested that the
air strikes in Syrian territory were an unjustifiable violation of
international law.197
The United States claimed that the airstrikes in Syria were lawful
acts of collective self-defense on behalf of the government of Iraq.198 Use
of force in self-defense has traditionally not been viewed as lawful
against non-State actors in a third State unless they are under the
effective control of that State,199 but the United States argued that since
190. Mattisan Rowan, ISIS After the Caliphate, WILSON CTR. (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isis-after-the-caliphate-0
[https://perma.cc/LC9K-F33W].
191. Syria Iraq: The Islamic State Militant Group, BBC (Aug. 2, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084
[https://perma.cc/SS2C-DUYD].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Brian Katulis, Hardin Lang & Vikram Singh, Defeating ISIS: An
Integrated Strategy to Advance Middle East Stability, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Sep. 10, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/sec
urity/reports/2014/09/10/96739/defeating-isis-an-integrated-strategy-toadvance-middle-east-stability [https://perma.cc/9LPS-JTGC].
195. CLAIRE MILLS, ISIS/DAESH: THE MILITARY RESPONSE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA
4–7 (2017).
196. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., ISIS AND THE SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 54 (2015). The United States did warn the Assad regime
about the imminent launch of airstrikes in September 2014 but did not
request the regime’s permission.
197. Id. at 55.
198. Letter from Samantha J. Power, Rep. of United States to the United
Nations to Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations (Sept.
23, 2014).
199. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 71–72 (Nov. 6); Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
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the infamous 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda,200 such force can be justified
where a government is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed
by the non-State actors operating within its borders.201
At first, the United States was isolated in its position. Its allies
pointed out that the International Court of Justice had repeatedly held
that unless the acts of non-State actors are attributable to the
territorial State, use of force against non-State actors in that State is
unlawful.202 Reaffirming its previous precedent, in its 2005 Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, the ICJ required the
responsibility of the Congo for the attacks of Ugandan rebels operating
from the Congolese territory in order to find Uganda’s right to selfdefense lawful.203 The post-9/11 case signaled the ICJ’s “determination
to counter a more permissive reading of Article 51” brought on by the
international community’s reaction to 9/11.204
Scholars205 and certain members of the International Court of
Justice were highly critical of the ICJ’s continued insistence after 9/11
that self-defense can only be claimed in cases where the attack by nonState actors can be attributed to the territorial State.206 Writing
separately in the Congo case, Judge Kooijmans noted that in the era of
al Qaeda, it is “unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to
self-defence merely because there is no attacker State.”207 Judge Simma
similarly concluded in his separate opinion in the Congo case that
“Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 146–47
(Dec. 19).
200. Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International
Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 835 (2001).
201. Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 497 (2012).
202. Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 839, 839–40 (2001).
203. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 145–47 (holding that
Uganda could not rely on self-defense to justify its military operation in
the Congo because (1) Uganda did not immediately report to the Security
Council following its use of force as required by Article 51, (2) Uganda’s
actions were vastly disproportionate to the threat, and (3) there was no
evidence from which to impute the attacks against Ugandan villages by
rebel groups operating out of the Congo to the government of Congo).
204. Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to SelfDefense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 261 (2011).
205. See id.
206. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 33 (separate opinion of Higgins, J.).
207. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 30 (separate opinion of
Kooijmans, J.).
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be read as affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State
actors can qualify as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of Article
51.”208
But it was not until ISIS bombed a Russian jetliner over the Sinai
desert on October 31, 2015209 and attacked a Paris stadium and concert
hall on November 13, 2015,210 that the situation was ripe for a Grotian
Moment. A week after these attacks, the U.N. Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 2249, which determined that ISIS is
“a global and unprecedented threat to international peace and
security,” and called for “all necessary measures” to “eradicate the safe
haven [ISIS] established” in Syria.211
The October 31 and November 13 ISIS attacks were a game
changer, killing and injuring hundreds of people, including nationals of
Russia, France, and twenty-two other countries.212 The attacks showed
that ISIS—the richest and most technologically advanced terrorist
organization in the world—was no longer confining its objectives to
territorial acquisition in Syria and Iraq, but had adopted the tactics of
other terrorist groups, focusing on attacking vulnerable targets outside
the Levant.213 Moreover, Russia was now just as much a target as the
West.
It is important to recognize that Resolution 2249 did not provide a
new stand-alone legal basis or authorization for use of force against ISIS
in Syria.214 Unlike past Security Council resolutions that have
authorized force, Resolution 2249 does not mention Article 42, or even
Chapter VII, of the U.N. Charter, which are the Article and Chapter
208. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 11 (separate opinion of
Simma, J.).
209. Gwyn Topham, Matthew Weaver & Alec Luhn, Egypt Plane Crash:
Russia Says Jet Was Bombed in Terror Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 17,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/egypt-planecrash-bomb-jet-russia-security-service [https://perma.cc/4QUM-GLVX].
210. Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994 [https://perma.cc/SE
7Q-77VD].
211. S.C. Res. 2249, pmbl. ¶ 5 (Nov. 20, 2015).
212. Topham, Weaver & Luhn, supra note 209 (reporting 224 passengers killed
on Russian jet); Mary B. Marcus, Injuries from Paris Attacks Will Take
Long to Heal, CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/ne
ws/injuries-from-paris-attacks-will-take-long-to-heal/ [https://perma.cc/
JV4X-GAJG] (reporting 129 killed and 368 injured in Paris attacks).
213. Beyond Iraq and Syria, ISIS’ Global Reach: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Sen. Bob Corker,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations).
214. ARABELLA LANG, LEGAL BASIS FOR UK MILITARY ACTION IN SYRIA 8
(2015), https://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/CBP-7404.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/2ML7-8WCD].
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under which the Security Council can permit States to use force as an
exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.215 Nor does the Resolution
use the word “authorizes” or even “decides” in relation to use of force.216
These textual differences led Professor Marc Weller to conclude that
“[t]his language suggests that the resolution does not grant any fresh
authority for states seeking to take action.”217
But the resolution does stand as a confirmation by the Security
Council that use of force against ISIS in Syria is permissible under the
inherent right of self-defense. Importantly, the French Security Council
Representative, who had sponsored Resolution 2249, stated in his
explanation of vote on the resolution that “collective action could now
be based on Article 51 [self-defense] of the United Nations Charter.”218
With a unanimous confirmation, Resolution 2249 has played an
important role in crystallizing the new rule of customary international
law regarding use of force in self-defense against non-State actors—a
phenomenon colorfully described by Professor David Koplow as
“helping to midwife the development of new norms of [customary
international law].”219
Resolution 2249 immediately changed government attitudes about
the legality of use of force against autonomous non-State actors. Within
two weeks of its adoption, the UK parliament voted to approve, by a
vote of 397 to 223, participating in airstrikes against ISIS in Syria—
despite the earlier views of many of those same MPs that such action
could not be legally justified.220 Immediately thereafter, the UK joined
the United States and several other States in bombing ISIS targets
throughout Syria.221

IV. Conclusion: Responding to the Critiques
Ordinarily, customary international law takes many decades to
crystallize. In this context, sixteen years, the time period from the 9/11
attacks to the Security Council confirmation that force could be used
215. Id. at 5–7.
216. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 211.
217. LANG, supra note 214, at 7.
218. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council ‘Unequivocally’ Condemns
ISIL Terrorist Attacks, Unanimously Adopting Text that Determines
Extremist Group Poses ‘Unprecedented’ Threat, U.N. Press Release
SC/12132 (Nov. 20, 2015).
219. Koplow, supra note 131, at 162.
220. Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, British Jets Hit ISIS in Syria After
Parliament Authorizes Airstrikes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/europe/britain-parliament-syria-airstrikesvote.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NCK2-ABGW].
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in self-defense against ISIS, is an extremely short duration for the
development of a new rule of customary international law. Historically,
there has been a series of other instances of so-called Grotian Moments,
where a context of fundamental change served as an accelerating agent,
enabling customary international law to form much more rapidly, and
with less State practice, than is normally the case. What do these
historic situations have in common? Each represented a radical legal
development. In each, the development was ushered in by the urgency
of dealing with fundamental change. In some cases, the change was the
advent of new technology, such as with offshore drilling and outer space
flight. In others, it was in the form of pervasive moral outrage regarding
shocking revelations of crimes against humanity, as preceded the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the Yugoslavia Tribunal. And in each case,
the new rule was confirmed by an international judicial decision, or a
widely supported resolution of an international organization, or both.
The changing law governing use of force against non-State actors
follows this pattern. ISIS and al Qaeda were widely viewed as
representing a new kind of threat, in which a non-State actor possesses
many of the attributes of a State: massive wealth, large numbers of
personnel, sophisticated training and organization, and access to
destructive weaponry.222 To respond to the fundamental change
presented by these uber-terrorist groups, the United States argued that
it is now lawful to attack such non-State actors when they are present
in States that are unable or unwilling to curb them.223 While States and
the International Court of Justice were initially reluctant to embrace
this new view of self-defense, in the aftermath of the attacks against
the Russian airliner and Parisian concert hall and stadium, Security
Council Resolution 2249 confirmed that use of force in self-defense is
permissible against non-State actors where the territorial state is unable
to suppress the threat that they pose.224 In the words of the Institute of
International Law, “where a rule of customary law is (merely) emerging
or there is still some doubt as to its status” a unanimous non-binding
resolution of the General Assembly or Security Council “can consolidate
the custom and remove doubts which might have existed.”225 Resolution
2249 capped a Grotian Moment and reaffirmed the importance of this
concept in international law.
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In closing, the article addresses five critiques that the author has
encountered at conferences and workshops where he has presented the
Grotian Moment concept.
The first critique asks whether the case studies discussed are
perhaps more evolutionary than the author characterizes them. For
example, the argument that States can use force against independent
non-State actors was used by the United States for over a decade to
justify its Predator drone strikes against al Qaeda throughout the
Middle East before its attacks on ISIS in Syria.226 As such, does the
Grotian Moment concept really just represent the tipping point that
every rule of customary international law encounter as they ripen? To
some extent that is true, but what makes a Grotian Moment
extraordinary is the context of fundamental change behind the tipping
point, laying the foundation for more than an incremental change.
The second critique suggests that greater historic perspective is
necessary to discern whether a development really constitutes a Grotian
Moment. Admittedly, during times of international flux, it may be easy
to perceive a turning point that is not really there.227 We will certainly
have a clearer picture of the state of law regarding use of force against
non-State actors with the benefit of a decade or two of confirming State
practice. For example, does it apply to all terrorist groups, or just ISIS?
Does it apply to pirates, narco-traffickers and other violent non-State
actors or just terrorist groups? Does it apply in all States where such
non-State actors are present, or just partially-failed States like Syria?
But international scholars and courts do not always have the luxury of
taking a position only once the law is crystal clear, as the International
Court of Justice has recognized in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons228 and in its 2019
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the
Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965.229 Past examples of
Grotian Moments may serve as a useful benchmark for assessing the
rapid formation of new customary rules in other areas of international
law.
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The third critique asks how the Grotian Moment concept can be
differentiated from the much-criticized concept of so-called “instant
custom”?230 Grotian Moments, such as the response to ISIS, represent
instances of rapid, as opposed to instantaneous, formation of customary
international law. In addition to non-binding General Assembly or
Security Council resolutions, some underpinning of State practice is
necessary, whether it precedes the resolution consistent with Professor
Myres McDougal’s “claim and response” approach,231 or follows the
resolution as envisioned in Professor Anthony D’Amato’s “articulation
and act” approach.232
The fourth critique asks whether the Grotian Moment concept
unfairly favors the great powers at the expense of less developed States?
Grotius, himself, has been accused of being a colonialist in his
mindset.233 And it is true that in the examples of Grotian Moments
discussed in this article, the largest, most economically and militarily
powerful, and technologically advanced States were the dominant
players in developing the new customary rules. But the phenomenon is
not unique to accelerated formation of customary international law.
Professor Charles De Visscher has drawn an insightful analogy between
the formation of ordinary custom and the making of a path through the
soil of the forest.234 While many animals pass by with barely a trace,
others, because of their relative size and weight or the frequency of their
passage, make deeper footprints.235 Understood in this light, whether
accelerated or at a glacial pace, the process of customary international
law formation has never been particularly democratic or fair.
And the final critique suggests that the Grotian Moment concept
might be destabilizing. Despite the distinction between instant custom
and the phenomenon of Grotian Moments, some States and
commentators are understandably apprehensive about a concept that
rationalizes rapid formation of customary international law. For them,
international law is best created exclusively through treaties, as to
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which States can opt out by non-action, simply by declining to ratify
the instrument. So long as customary norms take many decades to ripen
into law, customary international law does not seem threatening. It is
another matter if customary law can form within just a few years and
is deemed binding on States that have not affirmatively manifested
their persistent objection. In such case, they may abhor a concept of
law formation that appears more revolutionary than evolutionary.
But such apprehension is unwarranted. The Grotian Moment
concept does not represent something new and dangerous, but rather
provides doctrinal grounding for, and historic corroboration of, a
phenomenon that has existed since at least World War II. The case
studies involving the international law changes described in this article
demonstrate continuing international recognition that customary
international law must have the capacity in unique circumstances to
respond to rapidly evolving developments by producing rules in a timely
and adequate manner. “Grotian Moment” is an apt label for the
phenomenon of rapid formation of customary international law in such
times of fundamental change.
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